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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
This essay develops a theory of the evolution of international income levels. In particular, it augments the 
Hansen-Prescott theory of economic development with the Parente-Prescott theory of relative efficiencies 
and shows that the unified theory accounts for the evolution of international income levels over the last 
millennium. The essence of this unified theory is that a country starts to experience sustained increases in 
its living standard when production efficiency reaches a critical point. Countries reach this critical level of 
efficiency at different dates not because they have access to different stocks of knowledge, but rather 
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1. Introduction  
Over the last decade, a fairly complete picture of the evolution of international income 
levels has emerged. Figure 1 plots the path of income per capita relative to the leader for four 
major regions of the world going back to 1700 using data from Maddison (1995). In 1700, the 
living standard of the richest country was less than three times the living standard of the poorest 
country.
1 This is the nature of the disparity prior to 1700 as well, as no single country 
experienced sustained increases in its living standard over the pre-1700 period. After 1700, huge 
differences in international incomes emerged, as some countries experienced large and sustained 
increases in their living standards well before others.  
England was the first country to develop, that is, to realize sustained increases in per 
capita income. The exact date at which England began to develop is subject to debate. Some 
historians, such as Bairoch (1993), place this date at around 1700. Western European countries 
and countries that were ethnic offshoots of England began to develop shortly thereafter. At first, 
the increases in income experienced by these early developers were irregular and modest in size. 
For example, Bairoch (1993) reports that it took England nearly 100 years to double its income 
from its 1750 level. However, after the start of the twentieth century, these increases have been 
larger and relatively regular with income doubling every 35 years in these countries—a 
phenomenon Kuznets (1966) labels modern economic growth.  
Countries located in other regions of the world started the development process later. For 
these countries, the gap in income with the leader continued to widen prior to the time they 
started modern economic growth. For Latin America, the beginning of the twentieth century is 
the approximate start of modern economic growth. For Asia, the middle of the twentieth century 
                                                 
1 Bairoch (1993) estimates this difference in 1700 to be smaller than a factor of two.  2  
is the approximate start of modern economic growth. For Africa, modern economic growth has 
yet to start: although per capita income has increased in the majority of African countries since 
1960, the increases have been modest and irregular in the period that has followed.  As a result, 
Africa has continued to lose ground relative to the leader in the 1960–2000 period. Because of 
these later starting dates, the disparity in international income levels increased to their current 
levels. 
Some countries and regions have dramatically reduced their income gap with the leader 
subsequent to starting modern economic growth. For example, in the post–World War II period, 
Western Europe has managed to eliminate much of its income gap with the United States, the 
leader since 1890. Asia is another region that has been catching up with the leader in this period. 
The catch-up in Asia, in fact, has been dramatic because of the growth miracle countries of 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that doubled their income in a decade or less. Latin America, in 
contrast, is an example of a region that has not eliminated its gap with the leader since starting 
modern economic growth. Latin American per capita income has remained at roughly 25 percent 
of the leader for the last 100 years. 
A theory of the evolution of international income levels must account for these facts. The 
theory must generate an initial period with living standards at the pre-1700 level followed by a 
long transition period to modern economic growth. The theory must generate different starting 
dates for the transition to modern economic growth across countries. Namely, it must identify 
some factor or set of factors that differ across countries and that delay the start of the transition 
by as much as two centuries. The theory must also account for the sizable and persistent 
differences in living standards that characterize the experience of countries that have been 
experiencing modern economic growth for as long as 100 years. Finally, the theory must be  3  
consistent with growth miracles, namely, the large increases in relative income experienced by 
some initially poor countries in a relatively short period after 1950.  
There are well-tested theories of some of these phenomena, but not a comprehensive 
theory that accounts for all of them. This essay unifies these well-tested theories and examines 
whether the unified theory can account for all of these phenomena.
2 A well-tested theory of the 
first phenomenon, namely, the pattern of an initial period of stagnant living standards followed 
by a transition to modern economic growth, is provided by Hansen and Prescott (2002). The 
Hansen and Prescott theory is a combination of two long-standing and successful theories: the 
classical theory of the pre-1700 period and the neoclassical theory of the post-1900 period.  
The classical economists, in particular, Malthus (1797) and Ricardo (1817), developed a 
theory that accounts well for the constant living standard that characterized the pre-1700 era. The 
main feature of this theory is an aggregate production function characterized by fixed factors, the 
most important of which is land. With this traditional production function, increases in 
knowledge lead to increases in output that are completely offset by increases in population. As a 
result, living standards do not increase. Economists have also had for a long time a good theory 
of modern economic growth that has characterized the United States and much of Western 
Europe since 1900. Solow (1970) developed his growth model specifically to account for this 
post-1900 pattern of growth. The main feature of this theory is also an aggregate production 
function, but one with no fixed factor of production. With this modern production function, 
improvements in technology that lead to more output being produced with the same resources are 
not offset by increases in population. As a result, living standards rise.  
                                                 
2 Ngai (forthcoming) provides a unification of these theories along the lines of this essay.   4  
Hansen and Prescott (2002) unify the classical and modern growth theories by allowing 
people to use both the traditional production function and the modern production function. They 
show that when total factor productivity (TFP) associated with the modern production function 
reaches a critical level, the economy moves resources out of the traditional sector and into the 
modern sector. This is the date at which the transition begins. The transition is found to last a 
long period, roughly a century. The model thus gives rise to a pattern of economic development 
characterized by a long initial period of economic stagnation, followed by a long transition, 
followed by modern economic growth, as observed in Western Europe and countries settled by 
Western Europeans.  
The Hansen and Prescott theory is not a theory of the evolution of international income 
levels because it does not address the issues of different starting dates of the transition to modern 
economic growth, sizeable income differences for countries experiencing modern economic 
growth, and growth miracles. Some factor that differs across countries must be added to the 
Hansen and Prescott theory to make it a theory of the evolution of international income levels. 
Parente and Prescott (2000) develop a theory that accounts for the sizable differences in 
living standards for countries experiencing modern economic growth and that accounts for 
growth miracles. More specifically, they develop a theory of a country-specific TFP and then 
introduce this factor into a model in which only the modern production function is available. 
Their theory of country-specific TFP, which they refer to as a theory of relative efficiency, is 
based on policy differences. More specifically, the theory shows how various policies that 
constrain choices of technology and work practices at the level of the production unit determine 
the aggregate efficiency at which a country uses its resources in production. The development of 
a theory of relative efficiencies is essential. Despite the fact that there is ample empirical  5  
evidence that countries differ in relative efficiencies, a theory of international income levels that 
takes countries’ TFPs as exogenous is sterile, because it offers no policy guidance.  
In this essay, we augment the Hansen and Prescott theory of economic development with 
the Parente and Prescott (2000) theory of relative efficiencies and show that the resulting unified 
theory is a theory of the evolution of international income levels. In this unified theory, a country 
begins its transition to modern economic growth when the efficiency with which it uses 
resources in the production of goods and services in the modern sector reaches a critical point. 
Countries reach this critical level of efficiency at different dates not because they have access to 
different stocks of knowledge, but rather because they differ in the amount of society-imposed 
constraints on the technology choices of their citizenry. After a country reaches this critical point 
it begins to grow, and its income gap with the leader eventually stops increasing.  This gap only 
decreases if there is a subsequent increase in the efficiency at which the late starter uses 
resources in the modern production function.  A large increase in a late starter’s relative 
efficiency is the result of improvements in its policies and institutions.   
We show that plausible differences in efficiencies delay the start of the transition to 
modern economic growth by more than two centuries, as observed in the data.  We also show 
that sizable differences in living standards persist between countries that have been experiencing 
modern economic growth for as long as 100 years.  Lastly, we show that a large increase in a late 
starter’s relative efficiency can give rise to a growth miracle, as observed in Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan.  Thus, the unified theory accounts for the way international income levels have 
evolved.  
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a review of the classical theory of 
the pre-1700 income level followed by a review of the neoclassical growth theory of modern  6  
economic growth. It then concludes with a review of how Hansen and Prescott (2002) combine 
these two theories into a single theory of economic development. Section 3 deals with the second 
component of the theory, namely, differences in efficiencies. It reviews the Parente and Prescott 
(2000) theory of relative efficiencies. Section 4 develops the unified theory of international 
income levels. In Section 4, a model based on the unified theory is developed and calibrated to 
the U.K. and U.S. development experiences over the last three centuries. The calibrated model is 
used to examine the effect of differences in efficiencies across countries on the start of the 
transition to modern economic growth and the effect of an increase in a country’s efficiency on 
the subsequent path of its per capita GDP. Section 5 examines the development experiences of 
individual countries and groups of countries over the last three centuries within the context of the 
theory. Section 6 concludes the essay.  
2. A Theory of Economic Development 
In this section, we present the theory of economic development put forth by Hansen and 
Prescott (2002). We do this in three stages. First, we describe the classical component of that 
theory and derive its equilibrium properties. Next, we describe the modern growth component of 
that theory, and also derive its equilibrium properties. The last stage merges these two 
components and, in doing so, presents the Hansen and Prescott model of economic development.  
Figure 2 describes the general pattern of economic development. More specifically, 
Figure 2 reports per capita income of the leader country dating back to 2000 B.C. Up until 1700, 
the living standard in the leader country, or any other country for that matter, displayed no 
secular increase. These living standards were significantly above the subsistence level. In 1688, 
for example, the poorest quarter of the population in England—the paupers and the cottagers— 7  
survived on a consumption level that was roughly one-fourth the national average.
3 A few 
societies, such as the Roman Empire in the first century, the Arab Caliphates in the tenth century, 
China in the eleventh century, and India in the seventeenth century, realized some increases in 
their per capita income. However, these increases were not sustained.   After 1700 per capita 
income in England started to increase. Over the next 150 years, these increases in the leader 
country were modest and irregular. However, since 1900, these increases have been larger and 
fairly regular, with per capita income doubling roughly every 35 years. 
Technology was not stagnant over any part of this time period. Economic historians have 
documented a steady flow of technological innovations in this 2000 B.C. to A.D. 1700 period.
4 
Yet these innovations prior to 1700 did not translate into increased living standards. Instead they 
translated into increased population: as total output increased, the population adjusted so as to 
maintain a constant level of per capita output. After 1700, these innovations did translate into 
increases in living standards. 
2A. Classical Theory: The Pre-1700 Era 
Classical economists, most notably Malthus and Ricardo, devised a theory that accounts 
well for the constant level of per capita income that characterized the pre-1700 era. The theory 
predicts a trade-off between living standards and population size. This trade-off exists because 
population growth is an increasing function of per capita consumption and because there is an 
important fixed factor of production, namely, land. A key implication of this theory is that there 
is a constant standard of living to which the economy adjusts. The theory predicts that increases 
                                                 
3 See Maddison (1991, p. 10) and Bairoch (1993, pp. 101–108). 
4 See Mokyr (1990) for a review of this literature.   8  
in the stock of usable knowledge, which could translate into increases in living standards, instead 
translate into increases in population.  
Malthus’ theory of population is a biological one rather than an economic one. According 
to his theory, fertility rises and mortality falls as consumption increases. Being classical, the 
model has no utility theory and so agents have no decision over the number of children they 
have. Recently a number of authors, including Tamura (1988), Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 
(1990), Doepke (2000), Galor and Weil (2000), and Lucas (2002), have generated Malthus-like 
population dynamics in a neoclassical model with household utility defined over consumption of 
goods and number of children. These models follow Becker (1960) by having a trade-off 
between quality and quantity of children.  
We do not take their approach in this essay.  Instead the approach we take has society 
through its institutions and policies implicitly determine its population size. Although we 
similarly add household preferences to the classical theory of production, we do not define 
household preferences to be over the quantity of household children.  Consequently, in this 
societal theory of population growth, the quantity of children is treated as exogenous from the 
standpoint of the household.  
The reason we take this societal approach to population growth is twofold. First, there is 
no tested theory of population dynamics, and once modern economic growth begins, 
demographics play a secondary role in development. Second, and more important, the approach 
reflects the view that groups of individuals, namely, societies, have had a much larger say in 
deciding how many children a family has than the family itself. Societies have instituted and 
continue to institute policies that give them their desired population size. Often the policies of 
society are not what individual families want. In modern China, for example, a law effectively  9  
limits many households to one child. By contrast, Iran in the 1980s wanted a higher population 
and so implemented subsidies to encourage people to have more children. After achieving its 
objective, the government stopped these subsidies in the 1990s and began to subsidize 
contraceptives. India today, wanting a lower population growth rate, has set up family planning 
programs in many regions. In all these cases, the effects of policy upon demographics are 
dramatic. Even in poor and rural Indian villages, which did not experience any increase in human 
capital or income, policy has led to a dramatic decline in population growth rates in the late 
twentieth century. 
Why did society choose population size prior to 1700 so as to maintain a constant living 
standard? The answer relates to the fact that land was an essential input to the production process 
in the pre-1700 era. In particular, as a valuable resource, land was subject to expropriation by 
outsiders. Prior to 1700, a small group of people with large amounts of quality-adjusted land and 
therefore a high living standard could not defend this land from outside expropriators. For this 
reason, there was a maximal sustainable living standard. Society set up social institutions that 
controlled population so as to maintain the highest possible living standard consistent with the 
ability to defend itself from outside expropriators. Once an economy switches to the modern 
production technology, land is no longer an important input, so its defense is not an issue. At the 
stage when the modern production technology dominates, society sets up its social institutions 
that it sees as maximizing living standards subject to a constraint that a society perpetuates itself. 
For the purpose at hand, it is not essential that we model society’s choices of institutions 
that affect fertility choices. Instead, it is sufficient to treat the growth rate of population in a 
simple mechanical way, namely, as a function of average consumption. In order to reflect 
society’s choices, the function must display two properties. First, it must have a large positive  10 
slope, in the neighborhood of the pre-1700 consumption level. Second, for high levels of average 
consumption, the slope of the function must be near zero. The first property is only relevant for 
the theory of the pre-1700 era. The second property is only relevant for the theory of the post-
1900 period. This is the approach that we take in this essay.  
With this in mind, we proceed with a neoclassical formulation of the classical theory of 
constant living standards. There is a single good in the model that can be used for either 
consumption or investment purposes. The good is produced using a constant returns to scale 
technology that uses capital, labor, and land. An infinitely lived household owns the economy’s 
land and capital and rents them to firms in the economy. Land is fixed and does not depreciate. 
The household is made up of many members, each of whom is endowed with one unit of time. 
The household uses its capital, labor, and land income for consumption and investment purposes. 
The growth rate of population is a function of average consumption of household members. A 
household member’s utility in the period is defined over the member’s consumption in the 
period. The household’s objective is to maximize the sum of each member’s utility. The details 
of the economy are described as follows.  
Technology 
The classical theory of production is given by a Cobb-Douglas technology,  
(2.1)  
µ φ µ φ − − =
1
Mt Mt Mt Mt Mt L N K A Y . 
In equation (2.1), YMt is output, KMt is capital, NMt is labor, and LMt is land in period t. The 
parameter AMt is total factor productivity (TFP), parameter φ is capital share, and parameter µ is 
labor share. The Cobb-Douglas assumption implies unit elasticity of substitution.
5 We allow for 
                                                 
5 The precise value of the elasticity of substitution between land and the other factors is not important provided that 
it is not greater than one. The evidence is that throughout most of history the substitution of these other factors for  11 
exogenous growth in TFP. More specifically, we assume that technology grows at the exogenous 
rate of γM; that is, 
t
M M Mt A A ) 1 ( 0 γ + = . This assumption reflects the fact that technological 
change was evident from 2000 B.C.
6 
  Output can be used for either consumption or investment purposes. The resource 
constraint for the economy is given by 
(2.2)     Mt t t Y X C = + , 
where Ct denotes total consumption and Xt denotes total investment.  
Preferences 
Household preferences are added to the classical theory of production as follows. Period 
utility of each household member is defined over the member’s consumption of the final good. 
We assume a log utility function, because it is in the class of utility functions that is consistent 
with a constant-growth equilibrium and because empirically it is consistent with a wide variety 
of micro and macro observations. Household utility in each period is the sum of each individual 
member’s utility in the period. Strict concavity of individual household members’ preferences 
implies that the household’s utility is maximized by giving equal consumption to each member. 
For this reason, the discounted stream of utility of the household is just  









                                                 
 
land was limited, and, if anything, this elasticity of substitution was less than one.  The unit elasticity assumption is 
made because it simplifies the analysis. 
6 We follow Hansen and Prescott’s convention of using the letter M to index variables associated with the classical 
production function.   
  12 
where  β is the time discount factor, ct is consumption of a household member, and Nt is 
household size.  
As is evident from equation (2.3), we are using a dynastic construct. This is in contrast to 
Hansen and Prescott (2002), who use a two-period overlapping generations construct. We adopt 
an infinitely lived household framework rather than the two-period overlapping generations 
framework for two reasons. First and foremost, the empirical counterpart of a period is a year in 
the dynamic construct, while in the two-period overlapping generations construct the empirical 
counterpart of a period is 35 years. For the purpose of examining the model’s ability to account 
for the large increases in output realized in a short period of time after 1950 by countries such as 
Japan and South Korea, 35 years is simply too long a period to study. 
Second, the size of the effect on a country’s steady state level of per capita output 
associated with policies that determine its savings rate is sensitive to the construct that is used.   
The tax rate system of a country is an example of such a policy.  The level effects associated 
with this type of policy are in fact larger with the dynastic construct. This fact is important for 
judging whether differences in savings rates can account for the large differences in transition 
dates. If plausible differences in savings rates fail to give rise to 200-year delays in development 
in the dynastic construct, then they also fail to give rise to this delay in the overlapping 
generations framework, and we can conclude that some factor other than savings rates accounts 
for the pattern of development.
7 This is essentially the finding of the quantitative exercises 
undertaken by Parente and Prescott (2000). The choice of construct is irrelevant, however, in 
assessing the plausibility of other factors such as efficiency, as reflected in TFP differences: the 
                                                 
7 See Hendricks (2003) for a more detailed explanation of this phenomenon.   13 
size of the level effects is the same regardless of whether the dynastic or overlapping generations 
construct is employed.  
Endowments 
Each member of the household is endowed with one unit of time, which the member can 
supply to firms in the economy to earn wage income. The household is also endowed with the 
economy’s stock of land and capital, which the household rents to firms. Land in the economy is 
fixed in supply: it cannot be produced, and it does not depreciate. Without loss of generality, the 
total quantity of land in the economy is normalized to one. Since land has no alternative use 
aside from production, the input to production in each period is one. Capital is assumed to 
depreciate and evolves according to the following law of motion: 
(2.4)        t t t X K K + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ , 
where δ is the depreciation rate. 
Population Dynamics  
As mentioned earlier, because we take a societal approach to population size, we model 
population growth as a function of the average consumption level of household members. More 
specifically, we assume that the number of members born into a household in period t + 1 
depends on the average consumption level of household members from period t. Let Nt denote 
the number of household members in period t, and let ct denote their average consumption level. 
Then,  
(2.5)     t t t N c g N ) ( 1 = + . 
The function g is the growth factor of population from one period to the next. The classical 
prediction of a stable living standard at the pre-1700 level, cM, requires that the function g have a  14 
sufficiently large and positive slope at cM. This cM is the maximal living standard consistent with 
a society being able to defend its land. 
Equilibrium Properties  
For such a population growth function, there is a steady-state equilibrium with a constant 
living standard cM and a population growth rate equal to (1+γM)
1/(1−φ−µ) – 1.  This constant living 
standard satisfies g(cM) = (1+γM)
1/(1−φ−µ). Were the living standard to rise above cM, say, because 
of plague or drought, population increase would exceed technological advances and the living 
standard would then fall until it returned to cM. If for some reason c were below cM, the 
population growth factor would be less than the one needed to maintain the living standard, and 
the living standard would increase until it was again cM. Along the steady-state equilibrium path, 
aggregate output, capital, consumption, and the rental rate of land all grow at the rate of the 
population. Per capita variables as well as the rental price of labor and capital are all constant. 
Increases in technology in this model simply translate into a higher population rather than higher 
living standards. This is precisely the pattern of development observed prior to 1700.  
2B. Modern Growth Theory: The Post-1900 Era  
The classical theory accounts well for the pattern of economic development up to 1700. 
However, it does not account for the increase in living standards that occurred after 1900. Since 
about 1900, the growth rate of the early developers has been roughly constant, with a doubling of 
per capita output every 35 years. Modern growth theory, in contrast, does account for the 
increase. In addition to the roughly constant rate of growth achieved by developed countries over 
the last century and a half, other facts characterize modern economic growth. These facts are 
roughly that the consumption and investment shares of output are constant, the share of income  15 
paid to capital is constant, the capital-to-output ratio is constant, and the real return to capital is 
constant.  
  Modern growth theory accounts well for these modern growth facts. Quantitatively, the 
steady-state equilibrium of the economy mimics the long-run observations of the United 
Kingdom and the United States. This is no surprise: Solow (1970) developed the theory with 
these facts in mind. A key feature of that theory is a Cobb-Douglas production function that 
includes no fixed factor of production and that is subject to constant exogenous technological 
change. More specifically, the production technology for the composite good that can be used for 
either consumption or investment purposes is given by 
(2.6)    
θ θ − =
1
St St St St N K A Y .  
In equation (2.6), YSt is output, KSt is capital, and NSt is labor in period t. The parameter θ is 
capital share, and the parameter ASt is TFP, which grows exogenously at the constant, geometric 
rate  γS. As can be seen, the critical difference between the traditional and modern growth 
production functions is that the modern growth function does not include the fixed factor input, 
land.
8  
  Because the final objective of this section is to merge the classical theory and the modern 
growth theory into a single model, we maintain the same assumptions regarding preferences, 
endowments, and population dynamics as in the preceding subsection. The household in the 
model rents capital to firms and supplies labor. It uses its capital and labor income to buy 
consumption for household members and to augment the household’s stock of capital.  
                                                 
8 Again, we follow Hansen and Prescott’s convention of using S to index variables associated with the modern 
growth production function.  16 
  In contrast to the classical theory, population growth in the modern theory does not have 
any consequences for the growth rate of per capita variables in the long run. The choice of the  
population growth function is therefore unimportant in this respect. The standard procedure is to 
assume a population growth function g(c) that is constant over the range of sufficiently high 
living standards associated with the modern growth era. Population thus grows at a constant 
exponential rate.  
Clearly, population cannot grow at an exponential rate forever. At some population level, 
natural resources would become a constraining factor. If population were ever to reach this level, 
it would be unreasonable to abstract from land as a factor of production. But societies control 
their population so that it never reaches this level. Indeed, reproduction rates have fallen 
dramatically in the last 50 years, so much in the rich countries, in fact, that these countries must 
increase their fertility rates to maintain their population size in the long run. This suggests a 
population growth function that asymptotically approaches one.  
  In the case where the population growth function is a constant, per capita output, 
consumption, and capital all increase at the rate  1/(1 ) (1 ) S
−θ +γ  along the equilibrium constant 
growth path. The rental price of labor also grows at this rate. The rental price of capital, in 
contrast, is constant. Capital’s share of income is also constant and equal to θ, as is 
consumption’s share and investment’s share of output. As can be seen, the growth rate of the 
economy’s living standard is independent of the economy’s population growth rate: the only 
thing that matters is the exogenous growth rate of technological change. The population growth 
rate does have an effect on the level of per capita output along the constant growth path, but it is 
small. Thus, unlike in the model of the pre-1700 era, the population growth function in the model 
of the post-1900 era plays only a minor role.   17 
2C. The Combined Theory 
The classical theory accounts well for the constant living standard that characterizes the 
pre-1700 era, and the modern growth theory accounts well for the doubling of living standards 
every 35 years that characterizes the post-1900 experience of most of the currently rich, large, 
industrialized countries. In the period in between, living standards increased in these countries, 
but at a slower and far more irregular rate compared to the post-1900 period.  
We seek a theory of this development process, namely, a theory that generates a long 
period of stagnant living standards up to 1700, followed by a long transition, followed by 
modern economic growth. Given the success of the classical theory and the modern growth 
theory in accounting for the pre-1700 and post-1900 eras, the logical step, and the one taken by 
Hansen and Prescott (2002), is to merge the two theories by permitting both technologies to be 
used in both periods. We now present the combined theory of Hansen and Prescott, and use that 
theory to organize and interpret the development path of the leading industrialized country over 
the 1700–2000 period.  
In the combined theory of Hansen and Prescott (2002), output in any period can be 
produced using the traditional or the modern growth production function or both. Both 
technologies, therefore, are available for firms to use in all periods.
9 Capital and labor are not 
specific to either production function. In light of these assumptions, the aggregate resource 
constraint for the combined model economy is  
(2.7)      t St Mt t t t Y Y Y X c N = + ≤ + , 
the capital rental market-clearing constraint is  
                                                 
9 The maximum output that can be produced if both technologies are available is characterized by a standard 
aggregate production function  (,,) t tt t t Y AFK LN = . By standard we mean that it is weakly increasing and concave, 
homogeneous of degree one, and continuous.  Even though both the Malthus and the Solow production functions are 
Cobb-Douglas technologies, the function F is not Cobb-Douglas.    18 
(2.8)      St Mt t K K K + = , 
and the labor market-clearing condition is  
(2.9)      St Mt t N N N + = . 
Household preferences continue to be given by equation (2.3). Additionally, the population 
growth function continues to be given by equation (2.5), and it displays the properties that the 
function has a large positive slope in the neighborhood of the pre-1700 consumption level and a 
slope near zero for large levels of consumption.  
In their combined theory, Hansen and Prescott assume that the growth rate of TFP for the 
traditional production function and the growth rate of TFP for the modern economic growth 
production function are each constant over time. We deviate from Hansen and Prescott on this 
dimension. Although we maintain their assumption that the rate of TFP growth associated with 
the traditional technology is constant, we assume that the rate of TFP growth associated with the 
modern growth technology increases over time, converging asymptotically to the modern growth 
rate. We make this alternative assumption in light of the empirical counterparts of the two 
production functions and the historical evidence on technological change.  
The empirical counterpart of the classical production function is a traditional technology 
for producing goods and services that is most commonly associated with the family farm. A key 
feature of this production technology is that it is based on the use of land in the production of 
hand tools and organic energy sources. For this technology, the historical record shows gradual 
improvements in these methods over the last 2,000 years at a roughly constant rate of change.
10 
The empirical counterpart of the modern growth production function is a modern technology that 
                                                 
10 The exception to this constant rate of growth might be the Green Revolution in the middle of the twentieth 
century, where the introduction of new seed varieties resulted in large increases in farm yields associated with 
traditional farming methods.   19 
is most commonly associated with the factory.
11 A key feature of this technology is that it uses 
machines driven by inanimate sources of energy. For this technology, the historical record 
suggests modest growth in the eighteenth century, followed by much higher growth in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Lighting, communication, and transportation were important 
areas where this accelerating pattern occurred. Consequently, a more plausible assumption is that 
the growth of TFP associated with the modern production function increased slowly after 1700 
and converged to the rate associated with the modern growth era shortly after 1900.  
We emphasize that the traditional sector should not be thought of as primarily the 
agricultural sector, though most outputs of this sector are agricultural products.  What 
characterizes the traditional sector is that the household is the producing unit and typically 
consumes much of what it produces. Sugar plantations in the Caribbean and cotton plantations in 
the United States were not part of the traditional sector.  There was little incentive for people 
working in the traditional sector to develop more efficient production methods. Rapid increases 
in agricultural productivity occurred only when goods developed in the industrial sector were 
introduced in farming. The reaper and the tractor dramatically increased productivity on farms. 
Insecticides and fertilizers also contributed to productivity, as did the development of hybrid 
corn and new seeds. This is all well-documented by Johnson (2000).  
  An economy that starts out using only the traditional production function will eventually 
use the modern one. To see this, suppose that it were never profitable for firms to use the modern 
production function. Then the economy’s equilibrium path would converge to the steady state of 
the pre-1700-only model. The steady state of that model is characterized by constant rental prices  
                                                 
11 The distinction between technologies is, thus, not along the lines of agriculture and manufactures.  In this 
classification, modern agriculture with its use of synthetic fertilizers and tractors is associated with the modern 
growth production function.  20 
for capital and labor, rM and wM. Capital and labor are not specific to any one technology. Thus, a 
firm that first considers using the modern production function can hire any amount of capital and 
labor at the factor rental prices rMt and wMt. Profit maximization implies that a firm will not 
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This inequality must be violated at some date. Asymptotically, the rental prices would approach 
constant values if only the traditional production function were operated, and so the right-hand 
side of (2.10) is bounded. The left-hand side is unbounded because TFP in the modern function 
grows forever at a rate bounded uniformly away from zero. The inequality given by (2.10), 
therefore, must eventually be violated.  
At the date when TFP in the modern production function surpasses the critical level given 
by the right-hand side of (2.10), the economy will start using the modern growth production 
function. This marks the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. This result is independent of the 
size differences in the growth rates of TFP associated with the traditional and modern production 
functions.  Over the transition, more and more capital and labor will be moved to the modern 
production sector. The traditional production function will, however, continue to be operated, 
though its share of output will decline to zero over time.  This follows from the assumptions that 
land is used only in traditional production and that its supply is inelastic. 
We now use the combined theory to organize and interpret the development path of the 
industrial leader over the 1700–2000 period. The empirical counterpart of a period is a year. The 
initial period of the model is identified with the year 1675.
12  We attribute the stagnation of the 
                                                 
12 There is nothing special about the choice of 1675.  None of the results would change if the initial period were 
identified with some other year.  Only the value of AS0 would change in the experiments.  21 
leader prior to 1700 to an insufficiently low level of TFP associated with the modern production 
function to warrant its use. We attribute the start of economic growth of the leader in 1700 to 
growth in TFP associated with the modern production function so that its level exceeds the 
critical value given by equation (2.10). Lastly, we attribute the rising rate of growth of per capita 
output of the leader from 1700 to 1900 to greater use of the modern production function and the 
rising rate of growth of TFP.  
We proceed to parameterize the model. The model is calibrated so that the economy 
starts to use the modern production function in 1700. Following Hansen and Prescott (2002), we 
calibrate the model so that the steady state of the classical-only model (subsection 2A) matches 
pre-1700 observations and the steady state of the modern growth-only model (subsection 2B) 
matches the post-1900 growth experience of the United States.  
In the calibration, we deviate from Hansen and Prescott along two dimensions. First, we 
calibrate the population growth function so that it matches Maddison’s (1995) estimates for U.K. 
population growth rates over subperiods of the 1675–1990 period.
13 Given our theory of 
population growth, it is more appropriate to use the time series data from a particular country to 
restrict the population growth function for that country rather than cross-section data as Hansen 
and Prescott do.
14 Second, we calibrate the annual growth rate of TFP for the modern production 
function so that it remains at the traditional rate up until 1700, increases linearly to reach one-
half of its modern growth rate in 1825, and then increases linearly to reach its modern growth 
rate in 1925. 
                                                 
13 The calibration assumes constant population growth after 1973 equal to the average annual population growth of 
the United Kingdom from 1973 to 1994. 
 
14 We do not use the U.S. population growth rate data in the calibration. Doing so would not change any of the 
results because the population growth rate function is not important in the modern growth era.  22 
  Following Hansen and Prescott, we pick the initial capital stock and the initial population 
so that if only the traditional production function were available, the equilibrium would 
correspond to the steady state of the pre-1700 model, and there would be no incentive to operate 
the modern production function if it were available. This ensures that in period 0 only the 
traditional production function is operated and that there is a period of constant living standards.   
Table 1 lists the values for each of the model parameters and provides comments where 
appropriate. The population growth rate function implied by the U.K. population growth data 
used in the computation is depicted in Figure 3.  
For the parameterized model economy, it takes 150 years before 95 percent of the 
economy’s output is produced in the modern sector. Figures 4–6 depict the model economy’s 
development path along a number of dimensions. Figure 4 compares period t per capita output 
relative to 1700 per capita output for the model economy and the industrial leader as reported by 
Maddison (1995, Tables 1.1 and C.12). According to the model, an economy that begins the 
transition in 1700 will be approximately 28 times richer in 1990 than in 1700. Figure 5 depicts 
the growth rate of per capita output for the model economy over the 1700–2000 period. The 
growth rate of per capita output is slow at the onset of the transition, less than 1 percent per year 
on average before 1825. By 1900 the growth rate is near the modern growth rate of 2 percent per 
year. This pattern is primarily a consequence of the assumption that TFP growth for the modern 
technology increases slowly over the 1700–1900 period. Figure 6 depicts the path of the rental 
prices of capital and labor over the 1700–2000 period. As can be seen, the real wage rate 
increases steadily once the transition begins. The real interest rate, in contrast, shows very little 
secular change over three centuries.  These latter predictions conform well to the pattern of 
development associated with England, the United States, and other early developers.   23 
Table 1. Restricted Parameter Values 
Parameter Value  Comment 
γM–growth rate of TFP for 
traditional production 
.0009  Consistent with pre-1700 world 
population average annual growth rate 
of .003 
φ–capital share in 
traditional production  
.10 Consistent  with  pre-1700 estimates of 
land’s share reported by Clark (1998) 
and Hoffman (1996) 
µ–labor share in traditional 
production  
.60  Chosen so that labor’s share does not 
vary with the level of development as 
reported by Gollin (2002) 
AM0–initial TFP for 
traditional production  
1.0 Normalization 
δ–depreciation rate  .06  Consistent with U.S. capital stock and 
investment rate since 1900 
γS–asymptotic TFP growth 
rate for modern production  
.012   2 percent rate of growth of per capita 
GDP in modern growth era 
θ–capital’s share in modern 
production 
.40  U.S. physical capital’s share of output 
AS0–initial TFP for modern 
production  
.53  1700 starting date given initial period 
for model is 1675 
β–subjective time discount 
factor 
.97  Consistent with real rate of interest 
between 4 and 5 percent in modern 
growth era 
 
The predictions of the model are not sensitive to the value of the capital share parameter 
in the modern growth production function. This is an important result, because the magnitude of 
the capital share with a broad definition of capital that includes intangible as well as tangible 
capital could well be greater than the 0.40 share value used in the above exercise. The paths of 
per capita GDP, its growth rate, and rental prices are nearly identical to those shown in Figures 
4–6 for alternative values of the capital share in the modern production function. The transition 
still takes a long time. For a capital share as high as 0.70, 140 years elapse before 95 percent of 
the economy’s capital is produced using the modern production function.   24 
3. A Theory of Relative Efficiencies 
The Hansen and Prescott (2002) theory of economic development reviewed in Section 2 
is not a theory of the evolution of international income levels. It does not address the issue of 
why modern economic growth started at different dates in different countries. India, for example, 
began modern economic growth nearly 200 years later than did the United Kingdom. As a result, 
India’s income level relative to the leader fell from 50 percent in 1770 to only 5 percent in 1970. 
Neither does the theory address the issue of why some countries that have been experiencing 
modern economic growth for a century or more have failed to narrow the income gap with the 
industrial leader. In Latin American countries, for example, income levels have remained at 
roughly 25 percent the U.S. income level since the second half of the nineteenth century when 
modern economic growth began there. The theory does not address the issue of why some 
countries in the 1950–2000 period have been able to substantially narrow the income gap with 
the industrial leader. These countries include Italy, Spain, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the latter 
three all of which experienced a growth miracle. Some factor that differs across countries must 
be added to the Hansen and Prescott theory to make it a theory of the evolution of international 
income levels. 
One might be led to introduce differences in TFP associated with the modern production 
function to the model, because the Hansen and Prescott theory of development predicts that per 
capita income in a country starts to increase once TFP in the modern sector reaches a critical 
level. Moreover, there is ample evidence that countries (at least those experiencing modern 
economic growth) differ along this dimension.
15 Although it would be easy to introduce such 
differences into the Hansen and Prescott theory, it would not be useful, as long as country-
                                                 
15 See, for example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), and Hendricks (2002).  25 
specific TFP differences are treated exogenously. Absent a theory of country-specific TFP, the 
theory of the evolution of international income levels is sterile because it offers no policy 
guidance. What is needed is a policy-based theory of why TFP differs across countries at a point 
in time. 
Parente and Prescott (2000) develop a theory of TFP that attributes differences in TFP to 
country-specific policies that both directly and indirectly constrain  the choice of production 
units. Their theory of TFP is more appropriately called a theory of relative efficiencies. This is 
because Parente and Prescott (2000) decompose a country’s TFP into the product of two 
components. The first component is a pure knowledge or technology component, denoted by A. 
The second is an efficiency component, denoted by E. In the context of the Hansen and Prescott 
model, the modern growth production function is  
(3.1)      
θ θ − =
1
St St St S St N K A E Y .  
The technology component of TFP, ASt, is common across countries. It is the same across 
countries because the stock of productive knowledge that is available for a country to use does 
not differ across countries.
16 The efficiency component differs across countries as the result of 
differences in economic policies and institutions. Here we consider the case in which a country’s 
economic policies and institutions do not change over time, so  s E  is not subscripted by t. The 
efficiency component is a number in the (0,1] interval. An efficiency level less than one implies 
that a country operates inside the production possibilities frontier, whereas an efficiency level 
equal to one implies that a country operates on the production possibilities frontier. Differences 
in efficiency, therefore, imply differences in TFP. 
                                                 
16 Much of the stock of productive knowledge is public information, and even proprietary information can be 
accessed by a country through licensing agreements or foreign direct investment.  26 
Relative efficiencies at a point in time, and not absolute efficiencies, can be determined 
using the production function and the data on quantities of the inputs and the output. Thus, it is 
not possible to determine if any country has an efficiency level equal to one, although we tend to 
doubt that this is the case. Changes in relative efficiencies of a given country can also be 
determined conditional on an assumption on the behavior of the technology component of TFP 
such as that it grows at some constant rate.  
We now present the Parente and Prescott (2000) theory of relative efficiencies. To keep 
the analysis manageable, we present the theory of relative efficiencies in the context of an 
economy in which only the modern production function is available. The theory constitutes a 
theory of the aggregate production function when there are constraints at the production unit 
level.  
In light of this, we first review the theory underlying the aggregate production function. 
We then show how policy constraints give rise to an aggregate production function with a 
different efficiency level. We follow this by providing estimates of cross-country relative 
efficiencies associated with the modern production function using the mapping from policy to 
aggregate efficiency derived in this section with estimates of the costs imposed by a country-
specific policy. Finally, we conclude this section with a discussion of why constraints on the 
behavior of the production units exist.  
The Aggregate Production Function 
Before developing the mapping from policy to aggregate efficiency, we briefly review 
the theory of the aggregate production function associated with modern growth. The theory 
underlying the aggregate production function is as follows. In each period, there is a set of plant 
technologies B. A plant technology bB ∈  is a triplet that gives the plant’s output b y  and its  27 
capital and labor inputs, kb and nb. A plan {λb} specifies the measure of every type of plant 
operated. The aggregate production function, that is, the maximum Y that can be produced given 
aggregate inputs K and N, is 
(3.2)                               
0




== λ ∑  
subject to the two resource constraints 
(3.3)                               ∑ ≤
b
b b K k λ  
(3.4)                                ∑ ≤
b
b b N n λ . 
Assuming that this program has a solution, which it will under reasonable economic conditions, 
the aggregate production function will be weakly increasing, weakly concave, homogeneous of 
degree one, and continuous. 
  Empirically, the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function is the one consistent with 
the post-1900 modern economic growth era. The question then is, What set of technologies B 
gives rise to the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function? One such set is the set of plant 
technologies defined by 
(3.5)                    
θ k n d y ) ( ≤ .  
The function d(n) is an increasing and continuous function of the labor input. Assuming that 
1 ) ( max arg *
− =
θ n n d n  exists, the aggregate production function is 
(3.6)                      
θ θ − =
1 N K A Y , 
where 
1 ) ( max
− =
θ n n d A . A sketch of the proof is as follows. If any quantity of capital and labor 
is allocated to a single type plant in such a way that output is maximized, then the number of 
employees at each plant is  * n .  Thus, all operated plants, for an optimum, must have  * n  
workers.  Given  1 < θ , the capital stock must be allocated in equal quantity over every operated  28 
plant.  Thus, the number of plants operated is * /n N , capital per operated plant is  *) / /( n N K , the 
number of workers per operated plant is  * n , and maximal output is given by (3.6). With the 
assumption that the function d increases over time, the expression A will increase over time. 
 Consequences of Constraints for Aggregate Efficiency 
Next, consider the plant production technology with constraints imposed on it. We 
consider two types of policy. The first type constrains how a particular plant technology can be 
operated. The second type constrains the choice of which plant technologies can be operated. 
Certainly, these are not the only type of constraints that will affect a country’s TFP. A number of 
other types of policy have a similar effect.
17  
The first type of policy constrains how a given technology is operated. A policy that 
gives rise to this type of constraint is a work rule, which dictates the minimum number of 
workers or machines needed to operate a plant technology. In particular, suppose constraints are 
such that the input to a b = (k,n,y) type plant must be φK kb and φN nb for all plant types where φK 
and φN each exceed one. This implies that a particular technology, if operated, must be operated 
with excessive capital and labor. With these constraints, the aggregate production function is 
(3.7)                    
θ θ − =
1 N AK E Y S , 
where  
1 − − ≡
θ θφ φ N K S E . This is the aggregate production function used in Section 2. If the nature 
of the constraints were to double the capital and labor requirements, then the efficiency measure 
would be one-half. If the nature of the constraints is to quadruple both the capital and labor 
requirements, then the efficiency measure would be one-fourth.  
                                                 
17 For example, Schmitz (2001) suggests a mapping from government subsidies to state-owned enterprises to 
aggregate efficiency.   29 
   The second type of policy constrains the choice of which plant technologies can be 
operated. This type of constraint maps into the efficiency parameter of an aggregate production 
function with a composite capital stock made up of both physical and intangible components. 
Any policy that serves to increase the amount of resources the production unit must spend in 
order to adopt a better technology is a constraint of this nature. Such policies and practices take 
the form of regulation, bribes, and even severance packages to factor suppliers whose services 
are eliminated or reduced when a switch to a more productive technology is made. In some 
instances, the policy is in the form of a law that specifically prohibits the use of a particular 
technology. The empirical evidence suggests that this second type of constraint is more prevalent 
than the first.
18  
Following Parente and Prescott (2000), let the output of a quality b plant be given by the 
following equation: 
(3.8)   [min( , )] 0, 1.
P n
tP t t P yb k n n n
θ θ => θ <   
With this technology, a minimum number of workers, n, is required to operate a plant. The 
variable  kP denotes the physical capital input. The subscript P is introduced in order to 
differentiate physical capital from intangible capital later in the analysis. There are no increasing 
returns to scale in the economy, because if the inputs of the economy are doubled, the number of 
plants doubles.
19 
A plant’s quality is a choice variable. To improve its quality, resources are needed. This 
resource cost is the product of two components. The first component is technological in nature 
and reflects the cost in the absence of constraints. The second component, denoted by φI >1, 
                                                 
18 See Parente and Prescott (2000) for a survey of this evidence. 
19 See Hornstein and Prescott (1993) for a detailed coverage of this technology.  30 
reflects the constraint itself. The function that gives the required resources a plant must expend to 
advance its quality from b to b′ is 
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Here Wt is the stock of pure knowledge in the world in period t. Its growth rate is exogenous and 
equal to  W γ . Thus, 
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The variable kIt has the interpretation of the plant’s intangible capital stock; it is the value of the 
plant’s past investments in quality improvements. The plant technology is specified by  
(3.11)  
n P I I I
t Pt It
t
W I t n n k k y
θ θ θ θ α θ γ φ µ )] , [min( ) 1 ( + =
− , 
with  
(3.12)   It It I It x k k + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ , 
where δI and µ are functions of α,  W γ , and W0, and  ) 1 /( 1 α θ + = I . The sum of θI and θP is 
strictly less than one, so there is an optimal plant size, with all operated plants having  * n  
workers and equal amounts of both capital stocks. 
Aggregating over plants implies the following equilibrium aggregate production relation:   31 
(3.13)  
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θ α γ γ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + = + . The laws of motion for the aggregate capital stocks are 
(3.14)   ,1 (1 ) I tI I t It K KX + =− + δ  
(3.15)   ,1 (1 ) P tP P t P t K KX + =− δ + ,  
where 
α γ δ ) 1 /( 1 ) 1 ( W I + = − . 
Now if intangible capital has the same depreciation rate as physical capital, then the 
model with these two capital stocks is isomorphic to the model of subsection 2B with a single 
capital stock.  The single capital stock, Kt, is a composite of the intangible and physical capital 
stocks where  
















The capital share in the single capital stock model, θ, is just the sum of θI and θP, and investment 
in the single capital stock model, Xt, is just the sum of the investments in physical and intangible 
capital, XIt + XPt.     
For the sake of consistency and brevity, we continue to use the model economy with a 
single capital stock in our presentation of the unified theory of the evolution of international 
incomes.  In those instances where we wish to consider the role of intangible capital, we proceed 
by assigning a value to the capital share parameter in the modern production function that 
exceeds 0.40, the share of physical capital’s output in the national income accounts.  We solve 
out the model economy with a single capital stock and then impute the intangible and physical 
capital components, as well as their investments.  This can effectively be done using equations  32 
(3.16) and (3.17) given a decomposition of the total capital share into its intangible and physical 
components.
20 
Estimates of Aggregate Relative Efficiency 
The mappings developed in the preceding subsection allow us to impute the aggregate 
relative efficiency associated with the modern production function for various constraints. In 
general, the size of the effect of the constraint on a country’s aggregate efficiency depends on the 
factor input affected by the constraint and on that input’s share in the production function. In the 
special case where the constraints affect all inputs equally, that is,  n I P === φφ φ φ , the 
individual factor shares are unimportant and the efficiency level of a country is just Es = φ. 
Hence, the implied difference in relative efficiencies is equal to the implied cost differences of 
policy. Thus, if the cost difference in policies between two countries is a factor of five, the 
implied factor difference in aggregate relative efficiency is also five. 
Are factor differences in relative efficiency greater than five reasonable? Obviously, it is 
not possible to answer this question definitively without a comprehensive international study of 
the total costs of the constraints imposed by society. Some estimates of the cost differences 
associated with some country-specific policies do exist. Studies that estimate the costs of certain 
policies of individual countries that affect the technology and work practice choices of the 
production units located there do find that these costs vary systematically with income levels, 
with large differences existing between rich and poor countries. These studies suggest that factor 
differences in relative efficiencies could easily be as great as five.  
                                                 
20 We say effectively because there are two technical issues in the combined theory when capital is broadly defined. 
First, if intangible capital is not an input into the traditional production function, then the economy will need to 
make some investments specifically in intangible capital prior to switching to the modern production function.  
Second, after the transition, as new plants open, they will have a lower technology level compared to older plants.   33 
For example, Djankov et al. (2002) calculate the costs associated with the legal 
requirements in 75 countries that an entrepreneur must meet in order to start a business. They 
find that the number of procedures required to start up a firm varies from a low of 2 in Canada to 
a high of 20 in Bolivia and that the minimum official time required to complete these procedures 
ranges from a low of 2 days in Canada to a high of 174 days in Mozambique. These costs do not 
reflect any unofficial costs involved with starting a firm, such as bribes or bureaucratic delays. 
Because these official cost measures are positively correlated with indexes that incorporate 
measures of bribes, the true difference in start-up costs between low-cost and high-cost countries 
is surely even larger than those reported in the study.    
Reasons for Constraints 
The evidence strongly suggests that production units in poor countries are severely 
constrained in their choices, and the costs associated with these constraints are large. This 
prompts the question, Why does a society impose these constraints? A large number of studies, 
some of which are surveyed in Parente and Prescott (2000), suggest that constraints typically are 
imposed on firms in order to protect the interests of factor suppliers to the current production 
process. These groups stand to lose in the form of reduced earnings if new technology is 
introduced. These losses occur because either the input they supply is specialized with respect to 
the current production process or the monopoly power granted to them over the supply of a 
particular input is eroded.
21  
                                                 
21 Parente and Prescott (1999) show in a model with no capital how a monopoly right granted to factor suppliers can 
significantly lower a country’s efficiency.  Herrendorf and Teixeira (2003) extend this model to include physical 
capital and show that these monopoly rights have even larger effects on a country’s efficiency.   34 
4. A Unified Theory of the Evolution of International Incomes  
In this section we unify the Parente and Prescott (2000) theory of relative efficiencies and 
the Hansen and Prescott (2002) theory of development. The unified theory is then used to 
organize and interpret the evolution of international income levels. We unify the Parente and 
Prescott (2000) theory and the Hansen and Prescott theory as follows. We assume that 
technological level increases in both sectors result from growth in world knowledge. 
Consequently, the technology component of TFP in each production function is the same across 
countries at any point in time. The paths for the technology components of TFP are determined 
as in subsection 2C by requiring that the leader country with an efficiency parameter in the 
modern sector set to one start its transition to modern economic growth in 1700. We then 
introduce differences in this efficiency parameter across countries. Given a country’s relative 
efficiency parameter and the common path of the technology components of the TFPs, we 
compute the equilibrium path of the economy.  
As mentioned in Section 3, we doubt than any country has or had an efficiency parameter 
equal to one. The assumption that efficiency in the leader is one in the unified theory is not 
important to any of the results because it is just a normalization. Again, only relative efficiencies 
matter and can be determined. This is the case for countries at a given time and across time in a 
given country. 
We do not introduce cross-country differences in the efficiency parameter associated with 
traditional production. As mentioned in the introduction, incomes did differ slightly prior to 
1700, with the richest countries being no more than two or three times richer than the poorest. 
One possible explanation for these pre-1700 differences in income levels is that countries 
differed in policies that increased the inputs required for producing goods with the traditional  35 
production function. Because this technology corresponds to traditional farming and even 
manufactures produced within a home setting, we think the effect of policy differences for 
relative efficiencies associated with traditional production is small. For this reason, we favor the 
alternative explanation that some countries were better able to defend themselves from outside 
expropriations because of geography and thus were able to maintain a higher constant living 
standard during the pre-1700 era. Two countries that enjoyed such an advantage were England 
and Japan.  
We interpret delays in the start of the transition to modern economic growth to late 
starters having a lower relative efficiency in the modern sector, at least up until the date their 
transitions began. We attribute the persistent percentage difference between such a country and 
the industrial leader to the continuation of its low relative efficiency. Finally, we attribute catch-
up, including growth miracles, to large increases in relative efficiency in countries. 
We begin by computing the relative efficiency of a late starter required to delay the start 
of its transition by a given length of time. The size of the required efficiency difference between 
the leader and the laggard that gives rise to any given delay is a function of the capital share 
parameter in the modern production function. Our main finding is that differences in relative 
efficiency required to generate delays in starting dates of the lengths observed in the historical 
data are reasonable for all capital shares above 0.40.  
We then compute the entire equilibrium path of these late starters assuming that their 
efficiency levels relative to the leader never change. Large differences in incomes exist even 
after the late starters are in the modern economic growth phase. In fact, the gap between the 
leader and late starters increases for some time after the laggards have started the transition to 
modern economic growth. This is the case even though the transition period of late starters is  36 
shorter than that of early starters. The main finding of these experiments is that the gap in 
incomes between early and late starters never narrows unless the laggard adopts polices that 
increase its productive efficiency. 
The final set of experiments allows for a one-time increase in a country’s relative 
efficiency parameter. We assume that the change is unexpected from the standpoint of the late 
starter and viewed as permanent in nature. We then compute the equilibrium path and determine 
the country’s output relative to that of the leader subsequent to the change. We find that the late 
starter’s path of output relative to the leader subsequent to the change in its efficiency parameter 
is consistent with the experience of growth miracle countries such as Japan, but only if the 
capital share is between one-half and two-thirds.  
We conclude from this analysis that capital’s share must be large for the unified theory to 
be a successful theory of the evolution of international income levels.  A large capital share 
implies an important role for intangible capital in the production of goods and services and large 
investment in intangible capital as a fraction of GDP. Investment in intangible capital goes 
unmeasured in the national income and product accounts. Thus, it is not possible to determine 
whether a large capital share is plausible by examining national account data. One must examine 
other evidence, in particular, micro evidence to determine the plausibility of a large capital share. 
Thus, we end this section by examining the micro evidence on the size of unmeasured 
investment in the economy. We conclude from this evidence that the size of unmeasured 
investment in the economy is as large as the size predicted by the unified theory.  
Delays in Starting Dates 
We first examine whether the unified theory predicts large delays in the start of the 
transition to modern economic growth that some countries have experienced. In particular, we  37 
determine the size of the difference in efficiency required to delay the start of the transition to 
modern economic growth by a certain number of years.  
For the purpose at hand, it is important to provide a more thorough picture of the 
different starting dates for the transition corresponding to the experiences of individual countries. 
An issue is how to date the start of modern economic growth. Our definition of the start of 
modern economic growth is the earliest point in a country’s history with the property that the 
trend growth rate is 1 percent or more for all subsequent time.
22 Figure 7 shows the path of 
output in a number of countries relative to the industrial leader going back to 1800. As can be 
seen, starting dates vary substantially across countries. Mexico started its transition to modern 
economic growth sometime between 1800 and 1850; Japan started sometime between 1850 and 
1900. Brazil started in the early twentieth century, and India started its transition sometime 
between 1950 and 1980. Each country’s income gap with the leader increased prior to starting its 
transition to modern economic growth.    
The key expression for determining the delay in the starting date associated with 
differences in relative efficiencies is equation (2.12), which rewritten in relative efficiencies is  
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A country will not use the modern production function as long as the relation given by (4.1) is 
satisfied. Once a country’s efficiency,  S St E A , exceeds the critical level given by the right-hand 
side of (4.1), which it must, the country begins its transition to modern economic growth. 
Assuming as we do that relative efficiencies associated with the traditional production function 
do not differ across countries, the rental prices of land and labor will not differ much across 
                                                 
22 The concept of trend employed here is a highly smoothed path of per capita income.  38 
countries over the periods when each country specializes in the traditional production function.
23 
Consequently, this critical level of efficiency will not differ much across countries. It follows 
that the difference in starting dates between two countries i and j, with different relative 
efficiencies, is approximately given by the periods ti and tj for which  
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gives rise to a particular delay in the start of the transition depends on the size of the capital share 
in the modern production function. The reason for this is that the required factor difference in 
relative efficiencies equals the factor difference in the stock of pure knowledge, As, between 
starting dates. It follows that the required relative efficiency difference is smaller for larger 
increases in the stock of pure knowledge between starting dates. The size of the increase in the 
stock of pure knowledge depends importantly on its asymptotic growth rate, γS. The value of this 
parameter is calibrated so that the growth rate of per capita output associated with the constant 
growth path of the modern-growth-only model, given by (1 + γS)
1/(1−θ), equals 2 percent per year. 
Thus, the calibrated value of γS, and hence the implied size of the factor increase in pure 
knowledge between starting dates tj and ti, depends on capital’s share in the modern growth 
production function.  
We now compute the efficiency of the early starter relative to a late starter required to 
generate a given delay in the transition to modern economic growth. We do this for a range of 
values for the capital share parameter, since the value of capital’s share is not well restricted. For 
                                                 
23 They are roughly equal because the rental prices will not be constant in all periods that the economy specializes in 
the traditional production function.  This is because agents will start to accumulate more capital per household 
member in anticipation of the modern production function being used.  39 
each capital share value, we recalibrate the asymptotic growth rate of pure knowledge, γS, and 
the value of As0 so that the country with Es = 1 always starts its transition in 1700. These are the 
only parameters whose values are changed in the experiments.  
We assume that late starters are endowed with an initial capital stock equal to the steady-
state level associated with the classical model of subsection 2A. For the purpose of determining 
the date at which an economy starts to use the modern growth function, it is not necessary that 
we fully specify the population growth function of the late starters. In particular, it is not 
necessary to specify the population growth function for consumption levels sufficiently greater 
than the constant consumption level, cm, associated with the pre-1700 period. For consumption 
levels below this, we use a population growth function with a sufficiently large and positive 
slope at cM and for which g(cM) = (1+γM)
1/(1−φ−µ) . These assumptions ensure that the living 
standard in a late starter is roughly constant prior to the period it begins its transition. 
Table 2 reports the efficiency of the early starter relative to the late starter required to 
generate a 100-year, a 200-year, and a 250-year delay in the transition to modern economic 
growth. These delays roughly represent the difference in the start of the transition to modern 
economic growth between England and Mexico, England and Japan, and England and India. As 
Table 2 shows, the factor difference in efficiency needed for a given delay decreases as the 
capital share in the modern production function increases. The size of the required difference 
needed to delay the start of development for 250 years is plausible for all values of θ in Table 2, 
with θ = 0.40 probably at the lower bound of plausible values.   40 
Table 2. Required Factor Difference in Relative Efficiencies for Delays 
θ  1800 Start  1900 Start  1950 Start 
.40 1.60 3.2  5.7   
.50 1.25 2.5  4.0 
.60 1.20 2.2  3.3 
.70 1.18 1.9  2.5 
 
 
No Catch-Up After the Transition in Many Countries  
A number of countries, many of which are located in Latin America, began modern 
economic growth toward the end of the nineteenth century. By and large, these countries have 
failed to eliminate the gap with the leader over the twentieth century. We now examine whether 
the model can account for this feature of the data. In particular, we seek to determine if the 
model predicts a narrowing of the gap between a country’s income level and the level of the 
leader once that country begins the transition to modern economic growth. 
We address this question by examining whether the model absent any subsequent 
changes in relative efficiencies predicts a narrowing or widening of the gap between income 
levels between early and late starters. In particular, we compute the equilibrium paths of per 
capita output over the 1700 to 2050 period for the model economies associated with the required 
differences in relative efficiencies listed in Table 2. We also report their asymptotic incomes 
levels relative to the leader. 
Before undertaking these experiments, it is necessary to address two issues. First, it is 
necessary to specify the population growth rate function for the late starters in these experiments 
because increases in population affect the size of the increases in per capita output over the  41 
transition. For this specification, we simply use the post-1800 population growth rates of Mexico 
for the model economy that starts its transition in 1800, the post-1900 population growth rates of 
Japan for the model economy that starts its transition in 1900, and the post-1950 population 
growth rates of India for the model economy that starts its transition in 1950. These population 
growth data are taken from Lucas (2002, Table 5.1). Second, for capital share values that reflect 
a broad concept of capital, it is necessary to adjust output by the amount of investment in 
intangible capital. This adjustment must be made in order to compare the predictions of the 
model with the national income and product accounts, because the latter fail to measure 
investments in intangible capital.  Thus, GDP in the national accounts corresponds to  I X Y −  in 
the model economy. 
A country’s unmeasured investment as a fraction of its measured output can be 
determined given the decomposition of the capital share between its physical capital and 
intangible capital components. For a given total capital share, the physical capital component can 
be calibrated to the ratio of investment in physical capital to measured GDP in the leader 
countries of roughly 20 percent. In particular, the individual share parameter values can be 
calibrated to the steady state of the modern growth-only economy using this observation from the 
leader countries.  
With values of the individual share parameters in the modern growth production function 
in hand, it is possible to compute the amount of unmeasured investment in any period along an 
economy’s equilibrium path. Table 3 reports the size of the intangible capital share parameter 
and the asymptotic ratio of intangible capital investment to GDP for each of the total capital 
share values considered in Table 2. As the total capital share increases, both the intangible  42 
capital share and the intangible capital investment share of GDP increase. The sizes of the 
unmeasured investment shares range from 0.0 for θ = 0.40 to 0.62 for θ = 0.70.  
Table 3. Implied Intangible Capital Share and Investments 
θ  θI  XI/(Y−XI) 
.40 .00 .00 
.50 .28 .26 
.60 .41 .41 
.70 .53 .62 
 
Figure 8 plots the path of per capita GDP for late starters relative to the leader over the 
1700 to 2050 period. The paths correspond to the case where θ = 0.40. The paths are essentially 
the same for the other capital share values. For reasons of space, they are omitted in this essay. 
Asymptotically, the model is just the steady state of the modern growth model of subsection 2B, 
and so income differences are just 
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income level is 50 percent of the leader, for the 1900 starter, it is 16 percent, and for the 1950 
starter it is 6 percent.  
Most of the difference in relative incomes in 2000 is the consequence of the poor country 
starting the development process later. However, even after starting to develop, a late starter’s 
disparity with the leader increases, although at a much slower rate than before. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the disparity continues to increase because the traditional production 
function is still widely used at the start of the transition and the growth rate of TFP associated 
with the traditional production function is lower than the growth rate of TFP associated with the 
modern production function. Second, the population growth in these countries tends to be higher 
compared to the leader over the comparable period. The disparity with the leader stops  43 
increasing only after the modern production function starts being used on a large scale. For the 
1800 starter, the disparity stops increasing around 1900. For the 1900 starter, the disparity stops 
increasing around 2000. And for the 1950 starter, the disparity stops increasing around 2050.
24 
The increase in disparity over the 1950–2000 period for the 1950 starter is consistent with the 
fact that many sub-Saharan countries have fallen further behind the leader in the 1950–2000 
period despite experiencing absolute increases in living standards over this period. 
Laggards do experience larger increases in their income over their transition periods 
compared to earlier starters. For example, the country that starts its transition in 1700 realizes a 
factor increase of 1.2 in its per capita income by 1750. In comparison, the country that starts its 
transition in 1900 realizes a factor increase of 2 in its per capita income over the next 50 years.
25 
The reason for this difference is that the growth rate of knowledge associated with the modern 
production function is initially low, but rises over time. Thus, TFP growth in the modern 
production function over a late starter’s transition period is higher than an earlier starter’s 
transition period. This gives late starters an inherent advantage.  
  The data needed to verify whether this pattern exists are not readily available because per 
capita income estimates going back to the eighteenth century exist for only a limited number of 
countries. Thus, it is not possible to say whether transition periods have become shorter over 
time.  There is, however, strong evidence that late starters have been able to double their incomes 
in far shorter time periods than earlier starters.  
Figure 9 documents this general pattern. It plots the number of years a country took to go 
from 10 percent to 20 percent of the 1985 U.S. per capita income level versus the first year that 
                                                 
24 This is a key difference between our formulation and that of Ngai (forthcoming). Ngai examines the effect of 
policy on the starting date within Hansen and Prescott’s overlapping generations model.  In contrast, she finds that 
some part of the income gap will be eliminated once poor countries start their transitions.   
25 This assumes the same population growth functions for both economies.  44 
country achieved the 10 percent level. The 1985 U.S. level was 20,000 in 1990 dollars. The set 
of countries considered had at least 1 million people in 1970 and had achieved and sustained per 
capita income of at least 10 percent of the 1985 U.S. level by 1965. There are 56 countries that 
fit these criteria and for which data are available. Of these 56 countries, all but four managed to 
double their per capita income by 1992. The four exceptions all had protracted armed 
insurgencies that disrupted their development.  
The difference in the length of the doubling period between the sets of late and early 
starters is dramatic. For early starters, which are those achieving 10 percent of the 1985 U.S. 
level before 1950, the median length of the doubling period is 45 years. For late starters, defined 
as those achieving 10 percent of the 1985 U.S. level after 1950, the median length of the 
doubling period is 15 years. The choice of starting level is not important. A similar pattern 
emerges when the starting level is fixed at 5 percent and at 20 percent of the 1985 U.S. level. 
Although the model absent changes in relative efficiency infers an advantage to late 
starters, quantitatively it is inconsistent with the number of years in which many late starters 
have been able to double their income. Many late starters that doubled their income in less than a 
35-year period after 1950 did in fact narrow the gap with the leader over that period. The unified 
theory absent changes in relative efficiencies does not predict any catch-up for late starters. For 
the theory to account for this catch-up, it must consider changes in relative efficiency in a given 
country over time.  
Catch-Up and Growth Miracles 
We now examine whether the theory can account for the record of catch-up. A key 
feature of the evolution of international income levels is that many countries have been able to 
narrow the gap with the leaders, with some realizing large increases in output relative to the  45 
leader in a relatively short period of time. A number of countries, primarily located in Western 
Europe, caught up to the leader in the post–World War II period.  A number of other countries 
primarily located in Southeast Asia eliminated a large fraction of their gap with the leader in this 
period.  Some of these countries had miraculous growth experiences doubling their living 
standards in less than a decade in the post-1950 period. These growth miracles are a relatively 
recent phenomenon and are limited to countries that were relatively poor prior to undergoing 
their miracle. No country at the top of the income distribution has increased its per capita income 
by a factor of 4 in 25 years, and the leader has always taken at least 80 years to quadruple its 
income. 
  To account for the catch-up, including growth miracles, the theory requires an increase in 
the efficiency of a country relative to the leader.
26 In light of the Parente and Prescott (2000) 
theory, these changes in relative efficiency are easy to understand. Namely, they reflect policy 
changes. Following an improvement in policy that leads to a significant and persistent increase in 
efficiency, the theory predicts that the income of a late starter will go from its currently low level 
relative to the leader to a much higher level. As it does, its growth rate will exceed the rate of 
modern growth experienced by the leader countries, and the gap between its income and the 
leader’s income will be narrowed.  
We now consider an increase in a late starter’s relative efficiency. In particular, we 
examine whether the unified theory can account for the growth miracle of Japan. Figure 10 
depicts the path of per capita output for the Japanese and U.S. economies over the 1900 to 1995 
period. There is really nothing special about Japan relative to other economies that similarly 
experienced growth miracles. It would have been just as easy to study the cases of other growth 
                                                 
26 Additionally, an increase in efficiency can hasten the start of the transition to modern growth for countries that 
have not already begun this phase of development.  46 
miracle countries such as China, South Korea, and Taiwan in this experiment. The precise time 
period of the Japanese growth miracle we consider in the analysis is the 1957–69 period. We 
choose this period because by 1957 Japan had fully recovered from the wartime disruptions. 
Moreover, this period is one of the most dramatic in terms of Japan’s catch-up. In this 12-year 
period, per capita GDP doubled from 25 percent of the leader to 50 percent of the leader 
(Summers and Heston, 1991). This catching-up was not the result of the leader’s growth rate 
slowing down. Indeed, U.S. per capita GDP grew by 40 percent in this period. The Japanese 
economy in this period is a dramatic example of catching up. 
The experiment assumes an unexpected increase in 1957 in the relative efficiency of the 
model economy, which started its transition in 1900, to the level of the leader. This assumption is 
made because the data suggest that Japan in the 1957–69 period was converging to the U.S. 
balanced growth path. In calculating the equilibrium path of the model economy following this 
increase, we take the initial population to be the population corresponding to the equilibrium 
path of the model economy that starts the transition in 1900. The initial capital stock is assumed 
to be such that per capita GDP relative to the leader equals 25 percent.
27 The population growth 
rate function for the model economy is the same as before and is based on Japanese population 
dynamics. 
The important finding is that the total capital share must be large for an economy to take 
12 years to move from 25 percent to 50 percent of the leader. Figure 11 plots the path of per 
capita GDP predicted by the model economy over this period for various values of θ. For a value  
 
                                                 
27 In the case where capital is broadly defined, we assume the initial mix of physical and intangible capital is optimal 
in the sense that returns would be equal.    47 
of θ equal to 0.40, the predicted path shows too large an increase over the period. At the other 
end of the range, namely, θ = 0.70, the predicted path shows too small an increase over this time 
period. This leads us to conclude that capital share values in the range from 0.55 to 0.65 are 
consistent with the growth miracles. 
28  
It is possible to introduce this increase in efficiency in the poor country at a much earlier 
date, say, in 1800. The theory does not, however, predict that the poor country will experience a 
growth miracle. The theory, therefore, is consistent with the fact that growth miracles are a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Growth miracles are a relatively recent phenomenon because, as 
Figure 8 shows, differences in relative incomes between the low-efficiency and high-efficiency 
countries widen over time before leveling off. This widening is due to growth in the stock of 
pure knowledge associated with the modern production function, which the high-efficiency 
country uses from a very early date. Thus, as one goes back in time, the gap that a low-efficiency 
country could close by becoming a high-efficiency country becomes smaller and smaller. 
Obviously, if the gap is less than 50 percent, the low-efficiency country could never double its 
income in less than a decade. For the same reason, the unified theory is consistent with the fact 
that late starters have been able to double their incomes in far shorter times compared to early 
starters. 
  The theory is also consistent with the fact that growth miracles are limited to countries 
that were initially poor at the time their miracles began. Growth miracles are limited to this set of 
countries because a growth miracle in the theory requires a large increase in a country’s relative 
efficiency. A large increase in efficiency can only occur in a poor country with a currently low 
                                                 
28 There are a number of reasons capital’s share may be somewhat less than 0.60.  For one, we abstracted from 
leisure.  For another, we abstracted from household durables.  For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Parente 
and Prescott (2000).  48 
efficiency parameter. This rules out a rich country, which by definition uses its resources 
efficiently, from having a growth miracle. 
Unmeasured Investment 
For capital share values that are consistent with the evolution of international income 
levels, the implied size of unmeasured investment is between 35 and 55 percent of GDP. An 
important question is whether these intangible capital investment share numbers are plausible. 
This is not an easy question to answer. The difficulty in coming up with measures of the size of 
intangible capital investment is that the national income and product accounts (NIPA) treat 
investments in intangible capital as ordinary business expenses.    Such investments, therefore, 
are not measured.    
To better understand this, consider the case where a firm hires computer instructors for 
$100 to train its workers to use the latest software.  This expenditure of $100 by the firm clearly 
represents an investment in the stock of intangible capital.  It is not included in GDP in the 
national accounts.  In terms of the national accounts, the $100 is the payment to the instructors, 
and so enters the income side of the national accounts under compensation to employees.   
However, since the expenditure is treated as an ordinary business expense, the firm’s accounting 
profits are lowered by $100, and corporate profits in the national accounts are lowered by $100.  
These entries exactly offset each other so the transaction has no effect on either the income side 
or the output side of the national accounts.   The investment in intangible capital, thus, goes 
unmeasured.    
Parente and Prescott (2000) attempt to estimate the size of intangible capital investment 
in the U.S. economy by examining micro evidence of the size of the investments that firms and 
people make in intangible capital. In constructing their estimates, Parente and Prescott (2000)  49 
use the principle implied by theory that investment is any allocation of resources that is designed 
to increase future production possibilities. Using this principle, they identify such activities as 
starting up a new business, learning-on-the-job, training, education, research and development, 
and some forms of advertising as investments in intangible capital.
29 They conclude that the size 
of this investment may be as large as 50 percent of GDP.  Such estimates are consistent with 
capital share values between one-half and two-thirds. 
5. Catching Up  
The implication of the theory is that countries will be rich if they do not constrain 
production units as to which technologies can be operated and the manner in which a given 
technology can be operated. Currently poor countries will catch up to the industrial leaders in 
terms of production efficiency if existing barriers to efficient production are eliminated and an 
arrangement is set up to ensure that barriers will not be re-erected in the future. The removal of 
such constraints is a necessary condition for catching up. As discussed in Section 3, there is 
strong evidence that suggests that these constraints exist to protect the interests of industry 
groups vested in the current production process. As such, their removal is likely to be 
contentious. For this reason, it is instructive to examine the record on catch-up in greater depth 
for the purpose of determining the circumstances under which barriers to efficient use of 
technology were reduced and catching up with the efficiency leader occurred.  
5A. Catch-up Facts 
  Catching up is not uniform across regions, as can be seen in Figure 1. Latin American 
countries began modern economic growth in the late nineteenth century, and this set has not 
                                                 
29 Additionally, McGrattan and Prescott (2002) estimate the size of unmeasured investment in the corporate sector 
only and conclude that it is roughly 10 percent of GDP.   50 
subsequently closed the living standard gap with the industrial leader; the per capita income of 
this set remained at roughly 25 percent of the industrial leader throughout the twentieth century. 
In comparison, Asian countries with the exception of Japan began modern economic growth 
later. This set of countries experienced significant catch-up in the last half of the twentieth 
century. 
The large Western European countries, namely, Germany, Italy, and France, caught up to 
the industrial leader in the post–World War II period after trailing the leader for 100 years. 
Modern economic growth in these countries began about 1840. At that time, their living standard 
was about 60 percent of the industrial leader, which at that time was the United Kingdom. For 
nearly 100 years, these countries maintained an income level that was about 60 percent that of 
the industrial leader. In the post–World War II period, output per hour worked in these countries, 
which is a good measure of living standards because it recognizes the value of nonmarket time, 
increased from 38 percent of the U.S. level in 1950 to 73 percent in 1973 and to 94 percent in 
1992. Per capita output in Western Europe is still lower than the U.S. level, but this difference is 
accounted for by differences in the fraction of time that people work in the market, and not in the 
efficiency with which resources are used.  
Another important example of catching up is the U.S. development experience in the 
1865–1929 period. In 1870, U.K. per capita GDP was nearly a third higher than that of the 
United States. By 1929, the United Kingdom’s per capita GDP was a third lower than that of the 
United States. The dramatic growth performance of the United States in this period is an 
important fact that needs to be explained.   51 
5B. Reasons for Catching Up or Not Catching Up 
The United States 
We begin with the question of why the United States caught up with and surged past the 
United Kingdom in the 1865–1929 period.  Our answer to this question is that the United Sates 
was and continues to be a free trade club, while the United Kingdom was not a member of a free 
trade club in this earlier period. Our definition of a free trade club is as follows. A set of states 
constitutes a free trade club if it meets two conditions. Member states cannot impose tariffs and 
other restrictions on the import of goods and services from other member states. In addition, 
member states must have a considerable degree of economic sovereignty from the collective 
entity. Just as no single state is able to block the movement of goods between states, the 
collective entity cannot block the adoption of a superior technology in one of its member states. 
Thus, a free trade club in our definition is far more than a set of countries with a free trade 
agreement. 
The 50 United States certainly satisfy these two conditions, and thus, are a free trade 
club.  The individual state governments have a considerable degree of sovereign power over the 
federal government.  Additionally, the interstate commerce clause gives the federal government 
the right to regulate interstate commerce and prevent individual states from imposing tariffs and 
other restrictions on the import of goods and services.  With the formation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and the recent approval of the free trade agreements with Chile 
and Singapore, the set of states constituting the free trade club to which the United States as a 
whole belongs may be getting larger.
30 
                                                 
30 The United States was probably more of a free trade club in the 1865–1929 period compared to the post-1929 
period.  This is because the interstate commerce clause was interpreted in the earlier period to mean that states could 
not interfere with interstate commerce.  After 1929, the interpretation changed when the meaning of the clause was 
broadened to allow federal government to regulate interstate commerce.    52 
A free trade club, which prohibits individual states from discriminating against the goods 
produced in other member states and against producers from other member states operating 
within their borders, has the advantage that industry insiders in the various member states face 
elastic demand for what they supply. As a consequence, they are not hurt by the adoption of 
more efficient production methods as the increase in output leads to an increase in the 
employment of the factor they supply in that industry. If demand were inelastic, an increase in 
efficiency would lead to a fall in employment, something that industry insiders would strongly 
oppose.
31  Thus, a free trade club provides less incentive for groups of factor suppliers to form 
insider groups and block the adoption of more efficient technologies.  
A free trade club need not be composed of individual democratic states, as is the case 
with the United States.  However, in democratic states with legislatures representing districts, 
vested interests in other districts have a limited ability to block the adoption of technology in a 
given district if the citizens of the given district want that technology adopted. In the United 
States, for example, Toyota was able to locate an automobile plant with its just-in-time 
production in Kentucky in 1985. Those with vested interests in the less efficient technology in 
Michigan and other states with a large automotive industry were not able to prevent this from 
happening. The people in Kentucky wanted the large construction project and the high paying 
jobs in the automobile factory in their state.   In 1995 political pressure mounted to block the 
import of luxury automobiles from Japan. Toyota responded by building plants in other states, 
including Indiana and West Virginia in 1998 and Alabama and Texas in 2003.  These location 
decisions were as much politically motivated as economically motivated, and Toyota is close to 
being the third largest automobile producer in North America.   
                                                 
31 Dowrick and Spencer (1994) review empirical literature that finds union resistance to the adoption of labor-saving 
innovations occurs within an industry when employment and wages will fall as the result of the adoption of the  53 
Western Europe 
Western Europe caught up to the United States in terms of labor productivity in the 
1957–93 period for the same reason.  With the creation of the European Union, Western Europe 
became an equally important free trade club. Its states enjoy even greater sovereignty than do 
U.S. member states. The German state cannot block the Toyota introduction of just-in-time 
production in Wales even though German politicians would if they could in response to domestic 
political pressure. If Toyota starts gaining market share, it will not be long before the auto 
industry throughout Europe adopts the superior technology, and productivity in the automobile 
industry increases. This is just competition at work.  
The historical statistics lend strong empirical support to the theory that a trading club 
arrangement results in greater efficiency of production. Table 4 reports labor productivity 
defined as output per work hour for the original members of what became the European Union 
and the labor productivity of members that joined in the 1970s and 1980s. Productivities are 
reported for an extended period before the EU was formed as well as for the period subsequent to 
its creation. 
The Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 by Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, and West Germany to form the union. In 1973 Denmark, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom joined. In 1981 Greece joined, followed by Portugal and Spain in 1986. The most 
recent additions are Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. 
One striking fact is that prior to forming the European Union, the original members had 
labor productivity that was only half that of the United States. This state of affairs persisted for 
over 60 years with no catching up. However, in the 36 years after forming what became the EU, 
                                                 
 
innovation.  They go on to establish conditions under which this will and will not occur.  54 
the Treaty of Rome signers caught up with the United States in terms of labor productivity. The 
factor leading to this catch-up is an increase in the efficiency with which resources are used in 
production. Changes in capital/output ratios are of little significance in accounting for the change 
in labor productivity.
32  Productivity of the EU countries that joined in 1973 has also been 
catching up to the U.S. level since these countries joined the EU.  It will be interesting to see if 
Greece and Portugal, the two EU countries that have significantly lower productivity than the 
other EU members, continue to improve their relative productivity performance. 
Another interesting comparison is between the productivity performance of the set of 
original EU members and the set of Western European countries that either joined in 1995 or still 
have not joined the EU.  This latter set consists of Switzerland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden.
33   
We label this set of four countries the others. Table 5 reports labor productivities of the others to 
the original EU countries. 
The important finding is that the original EU countries and the others are equally 
productive in the pre–World War II period. In the 36 years from 1957 to 1993, the others fell 
from 1.06 times as productive as the original EU countries to only 0.81 times as productive in 
1993. This constitutes strong empirical evidence that membership in the EU fosters higher 
productivity.  
The EU is scheduled to expand from 15 to 25 members in March of 2004.  The new 
countries include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic, which are all 
former Communist states located in central Europe.  Maddison (2001, p. 337) estimates that their  
 
                                                 
32 See Prescott (2002). 
33 Norway is not included in this set of countries because of the large size of its oil industry.  55 
per employee GDP, which is a good proxy for productivity, was about 40 percent of Western 
Europe in 1998. If history is any guide, these countries will narrow the productivity gap with the 
original EU members and the United States.  Three of the ten scheduled joiners, namely, Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovenia, already have relatively high GDP per capita and have little catching up to 
do.    They are all small countries that are highly economically integrated with Western European 
states and have been de facto members of the Western European trading club for a number of 
years.   Countries that are economically integrated with other sovereign states can be rich, even if 
no formal treaty exists.   56 
 
Table 4.  Labor Productivities of European Union Members 
as a Percentage of U.S. Productivity
a 
Year  Original Members  Members Joining in 1973 
1870 62   
1913 53   
1929 52   
1938 57   
1957 53  57 
1973 78  66 
1983 94  76 
1993 102  83 
2002 101  85 
 
a The  prewar numbers are population weighted labor productivity numbers from Maddison 
(1995). The postwar numbers are also population weighted and were obtained from Maddison’s 
Web page, http://www.eco.rug.nl/GGDC/index-series.html#top.  
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Table 5.  Labor Productivity of Other Western European Countries 
 as a Percentage of Original EU Members
a 
 









a The prewar figures are from Maddison (1995). For this period, GDP per capita is used as a 
proxy for productivity. The postwar numbers are also population weighted and were obtain from 
Maddison’s Web page, http://www.eco.rug.nl/GGDC/index-series.html#top.  
 
Latin America 
Latin American countries failed to catch up because they have failed to develop into a 
free trade club.  For this reason, Latin American per capita income has remained at the same 
level relative to the leader for the last century. There is no free movement of goods and people 
between the set of relatively sovereign states. A consequence of this is that often industry 
insiders in the sovereign states face inelastic demand for their products or services, and this leads 
them to block the adoption of more efficient production practices. If Latin American countries 
were to decentralize and restrict the authority of their central governments to be like the United 
States in the 1865–1929 period, then they too would quickly become as rich as Western Europe 




The reasons for catch-up in Asia are slightly more involved. Countries such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan were forced to adopt policies that did not block efficient production as 
a condition for support from the United States. Further, the need to finance national defense 
made protecting those with vested interests in inefficient production too expensive to South 
Korea and Taiwan. These development miracles along with the Hong Kong and Singapore 
growth miracles made it clear to the people of the democratic states in the region that the policy 
that their elected representatives followed mattered for their living standard. Their elected 
representatives had no choice but to cut back on protecting industry insiders with vested interests 
in inefficient production or be voted out of office.  
China 
The recent catching up done by China is primarily a result of it becoming a free trade 
club. The rapid development of China began in 1978 when the Chinese government became 
more decentralized, with much of the centralized planning system dismantled. Although the 
central government gave more power to regional governments, it did not give the regional 
governments the right to restrict the flow of goods across regions.  In fact, when individual 
regions attempted to erect trade barriers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the central 
government immediately took steps to restore the free flow of goods and services.
34 The 
resulting competition between businesses in various provinces led to rapid growth in living 
standards.  
 
                                                 
34 See Young (2000).  59 
Russia 
While China’s performance since its transition to capitalism has been spectacular, the 
same cannot be said for Russia’s performance since its transition to capitalism.   Whereas China 
has closed some of its income gap with the leader, Russia has fallen further behind the leader.   
Between 1985 and 1998, Russia’s per capita GDP fell from 30 percent to 22 percent of the U.S. 
level (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002, p. 62).   Why has Russia failed to catch up to the leader 
following its switch to capitalism?   
Russia is not a free trade club and does not belong to a free trade club. It is not 
economically integrated with Western Europe.  It is large enough both in terms of population and 
land that its regions could make up a free trade club.  However, this is not the case.   Local and 
regional governments in Russia have the power to discriminate against producers from other 
member states operating within their borders and to restrict the flow of goods and people into 
and out of their region.    For example, in response to the financial crisis of August 1988, 
regional governments prohibited exports of food goods from their regions and put in place price 
ceilings for many of those items.  Regional governments further have the discretion to use 
federal funds for purposes they see fit.  Often, these funds are used to keep inefficient industries 
afloat.
    Local governments also have control over the use and privatization of land. There are 
essentially no land and real estate markets.  In general, the purchase of land and the conversion 
of nonindustrial structures for new commercial activity are not possible.   During the 
privatization phase, local governments refused to lease any property that had not been used 
commercially.
35 
                                                 
35 Parente and Riós-Rull (2001) document the greater prevalence of specialized groups of factor suppliers in Russia 
compared to China, and the successful efforts by local governments in Russia to prevent the adoption of better 
technologies.   
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6. Concluding Remarks  
Will the whole world be rich by the end of the twenty-first century? The implication of 
the theory reviewed in this essay is that a country will catch up to the leading industrial countries 
only if it eliminates the constraints relating to the use of technology. Although it is clear what a 
country must do to become rich, it is not clear whether a country will have either the political 
will or political power to make the necessary reforms. Removal of the constraints to the efficient 
use of resources is bound to be contentious, because such constraints typically exist to protect 
specialized groups of factor suppliers and corporate interests. As recent events in Argentina 
show, these groups can topple a government.  
The historical record of catch-up suggests that joining a free trade club is an important 
way by which a society can eliminate barriers that were erected to protect specialized groups of 
factor suppliers and corporate interests and reduce the likelihood that such groups will seek 
similar protection in the future.  The expansion of the European Union as well as the recent U.S. 
free trade agreements with Central American countries, Chile, Singapore, and Australia are 
encouraging events. These events show that more and more regions are gaining the political will 
to reduce these constraints. However, many other regions of the world, particularly Africa, the 
Indian subcontinent, and South America, still lack this will.  
Why one country has this will and another does not is an important open question.  As a 
first step toward answering it, it is imperative that economists better understand how it is that 
constraints to the efficient use of resources come to be imposed on a society in the first place. 
Some progress is being made in this area. Grossman and Helpman (1994), Holmes and Schmitz 
(1995; 2001), Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996; 2002), McDermott (1999), Kocherlakota (2000), 
Bridgman, Livshits, and MacGee (2001), Parente and Ríos-Rull (2001), Samaniego (2001),  61 
Teixeira (2001), and Parente and Zhao (2003) all deal with this issue to some degree. In our 
view, this will continue to be an important research area in the years to come.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of International Incomes: 1700–1990 
(Fraction of Leader) 
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Figure 2: Income per Capita of the Leader Relative to the Pre-1800 Level 
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Figure 7: Different Countries Start at Different Dates, Income per Capita in 1990 $U.S. 


































Figure 9: Years for Income per Capita to Grow from 2,000 to 4,000 (1990 $U.S.) 
 





Figure 10: Income per Capita 1900–95 (1990 $US) 
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